There has been quite a bit of media coverage on the recent decline in the U.S. birth rate, including a blog I wrote in March http://prbblog.org/index.php/2013/03/26/why-has-the-u-s-birth-rate-recently-declined/.

Much of the decline was due to a surprisingly large drop in the Hispanic birth rate. But how do Hispanic teenagers compare to other ethnic groups on this measure? Simply put, just the same.

Fertility among Hispanic teenagers ages 15 to 19 fell quite sharply, particularly among Mexican Americans whose birth rate is now equal to that of the total Hispanic group. The birth rate of Hispanic adolescents had been much higher than that of black non-Hispanic adolescents, but now the three minority groups shown in the graph are virtually equal. If we accept the widely held notion that U.S. birth rates have dropped due to the effects of the Great Recession, then there is a strong suggestion in these rates that Hispanic teens were the most adversely affected.

Will those rates rise again when the recession ends, as it has shown some signs of doing? Or might this be a permanent change? This is an important question for many reasons. For one, the United States has long had a much higher adolescent birth rate than the majority of developed countries. For example, the overall U.S. birth rate of 31.3 births per 1,000 women ages 15 to 19 (for 2011) is well above that of Japan (4.6), Germany (8.9), France (10.2), and Ireland (14.9).

The Census Bureau released alternative U.S. population projections today, to supplement the “middle series” projections they released in December. The new projections are based on three immigration scenarios, or “variants,” each with different implications for growth:

• Low immigration: Assumes that net international migration will range from 704,000 to 824,000 per year.
• Constant immigration: Assumes immigration levels will remain at current levels (around 725,000 per year).
• High immigration: Assumes immigration levels will range from 884,000 to 1.6 million per year.

Projections of the U.S. population, under each of these scenarios, are significantly lower than those produced by the Census Bureau just a few years ago. The Census Bureau’s “low immigration” series from 2009 projected that the U.S. population would reach 422.6 million by 2050. But the “high immigration” series released today projects a smaller U.S. population in 2050—just 415.7 million people—than the previous “low immigration” series (see table).

Projected U.S. Population in 2050 (000s)

Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

Why the big change? The latest projections reflect a new post-recession demographic reality in the United States, characterized by lower levels of immigration, slower population growth, and more rapid population aging. Between 2010 and 2012, the U.S. population increased by 0.7 percent each year, after averaging 0.9 percent growth each year from 2000 through 2010.

It’s too soon to tell if this slow growth will continue or if the population will rebound with the growing U.S. economy. Future immigration levels in the United States are hard to predict because they depend on a complex mix of “push” and “pull” factors. Although immigration levels have dropped since the onset of the recession in 2007, they could increase in the coming decades, depending on the availability of jobs and changes in federal and state immigration laws.

EQUATORIAL GUINEA. The 2011 Equatorial Guinea Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) summary report has measured a relatively high level of fertility. The total fertility rate (TFR, or the average number of children per woman) was reported as 5.1. Given that the country’s TFR in 1950 was estimated at 5.5 by the United Nations Population Division, there has been very little decrease over a long period. Women gave six children as their ideal, while men opted for seven children. The TFR for urban areas was 4.4, and higher for rural areas at 5.9.

Childbearing begins early in Equatorial Guinea, on average when the mother is 18 years old. Among women ages 25 to 49, 14 percent had married or were in union by age 15. Among men, however, less than half  below age 30 were married by age 15. And 17 percent of women were in polygamous unions.

The survey reported that 13 percent of married women  were using some form of family planning, with 10 percent using a modern method, including injectables, pill, and the male condom.

Infant and child mortality are quite high  The infant mortality rate is 65 deaths of children under age 1 per 1,000 live births, and 113 deaths of children under age 5 per 1,000 live births. The survey also measured HIV prevalence. Among women ages 15 to 49, 8.3 percent were found to be HIV positive, and 3.7 percent for men.

Reference
Guinée Équatoriale, Enquête Démographique et de Santé 2011, Rapport synthèse, Ministère de la Santé et du Bien-Être Social, Ministère de la Planification, du Développement Économique et des Investissements Publics, ICF International

SURINAME. The 2010 Suriname  Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS4) final report is now available. The country’s total fertility rate (TFR, or the average number of children per woman) is currently estimated at 2.3. There appears to have been little change in the use of family planning in recent years, with 48 percent of currently married women ages 15 to 49 using some method, up from 46 percent in the 2006 MICS3. Modern contraceptive methods accounted for virtually all family planning use, with 25 percent using the pill and 11 percent having undergone sterilization.

As in all MICS surveys, the report contains  a large amount of information on maternal and child health in addition to other topics such as malaria, knowledge of HIV, and water supply and sanitation.

Reference
Suriname, Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2010, Government of Suriname, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)

In a population projection, it’s customary to assume that all countries with higher birth rates will see their total fertility rate (TFR, or the average number of children per woman) drop to 2.1 children, the “replacement level” (a couple “replaces” itself by having two children, and thus doesn’t add to population growth).

While preparing the upcoming 2013 edition of PRB’s World Population Data Sheet (release scheduled for Sept. 10) and previous editions over the years, I’ve been noticing a group of countries whose rates have come down quite a bit but they seem to be resisting further decline. Here are three countries with TFRs spanning from 2000 to 2011:

• Azerbaijan: 2.0 to 2.38
• Kazakhstan: 1.85 to 2.59
• Israel: 2.95 to 3.0

All three countries show a very flat trend. In the case of Israel, people often ask if the TFR is due to the non-Israeli population. There is some truth in that, as the Muslim TFR is higher at 3.5, but the TFR of the Jewish population is 3.0 and has been since the 1980s. Other countries that appear to fall in this category are Argentina, Indonesia, Jordan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and possibly Turkmenistan.

Watching fertility trends in these countries is getting interesting!

In 2012, and for the first time in history, women held 20 percent of seats in the world’s national governing bodies (parliaments and congresses), nearly doubling since 1997, according to the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). However, these gains were spread disproportionately among the world’s nations and the progress has been too slow to achieve the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goal 3 of equal representation for women by 2015.

Women hold the largest shares of legislative seats—23 percent and 24 percent, respectively—in Europe and “the Americas,” an IPU regional category that includes nations in North America, South America, Central America, and the Caribbean. In the United States, women gained a record number of seats in the 2012 election, but the share held by women (18 percent) remains below the regional average. U.S. women hold 98 of the 535 congressional seats—20 seats in the Senate and 78 in the House of Representatives, according to the Center for American Women and Politics at Rutgers University.

IPU data show that women tend to possess portfolios that focus overwhelmingly on social topics such as women’s issues, family, children, and education than on other policy areas. This finding suggests that increasing the number of women legislators may lead to increased attention to gender issues, such as women’s rights and funding for girls’ education. For example, when Malawi’s President Joyce Banda first became the minister of gender, child welfare, and community services, she was instrumental in passing a domestic violence act, which for seven years prior failed to garner the necessary votes to become law.

Only one-fifth of women ministers worldwide contribute to the creation of economic and development policy and just one-fourth cite finance and budgetary issues as their policy priority, according to the IPU.

by Jay Gribble, vice president, International Programs

As I listen to people give their presentations, I continue to be reminded that high-quality data is critical to decisionmaking. Similarly, consistent definitions need to be employed that reflect the current thinking on issues. For example, the standard definition of the dependency ratio includes the population ages 0 to 14 and the population ages 65 and over in the numerator (they are the dependent populations) and the population ages 15 to 64 in the denominator (they are the population that provide support). Yet if one of the goals of investing in human capital is to keep people in school longer, perhaps the definition needs to be modified so that the people ages 15 to 19 fall into the dependent population. Our definitions need to be consistent with our goals.

The first blog I ever wrote for PRB considered the fact that national-level data cover up the disparities that exist in a country. Since that time, I’ve had the chance to talk and write more about the variation in Malawi’s population based on wealth quintiles (see Population Bulletin, Box 1). Malawi still has many challenges to development, but when one looks at the data from the wealthiest quintiles, there is reason for optimism that a demographic transition is under way. In that segment, fertility is down, education is up; it reinforces the importance of targeting social development programs to the poor segments of the population, so that everyone has access to health and education and an opportunity to get ahead.

Many of the issues that will underpin the success of achieving a demographic dividend are difficult to measure. We talk about the importance of gender equitable policies and empowering women to make decisions for themselves and their children. Yet these are some of the most difficult issues to measure. It isn’t impossible, but it isn’t easy either. Counting the number of women parliamentarians, for example, is an indication of gender movement, but some countries have targets related to this measure, so it may not adequately reflect the degree to which women are empowered. There will always be varying degrees of empowerment, and it’s important to be able to measure this critical component of social and economic development.

So as I sign off on “Behind the Numbers,” I realize again how important data are to development. It’s critical to have high-quality data to understand the situation; it’s important to use those data to make assumptions about how things will move forward; and it’s critical to link data to decisionmaking. At this meeting of ministers of finance and planning, I’m reminded that unless these critical decisionmakers understand the links between human capital and economic and social development, they are not likely to prioritize social investments in the budget process. Thus, researchers who generate data must collaborate with organizations that put research in perspective, making the findings understandable and useable; and advocates must have access to this information so that they can persuade policymakers to prioritize human capital in the national agenda. No easy task, but the process has happened many times before, and I’m confident that it will continue to happen—thanks to the hard work of people at each step.

by Jay Gribble, vice president, International Programs

It’s worth noting that African nations have signed a number of regional proclamations and agreements that support the health and well-being of their people. A speaker on youth reminded the audience that the African Union has put forward a number of agreements that support youth labor programs; the Abuja agreement calls for countries putting 15 percent of their budgets into health; another speaker pointed out that Africa has numerous agreements that support maternal and child health. But what difference do these agreements really make?

As I reflect on the number of policies, agreements, and declarations that have been signed into existence, I can’t help but wonder why progress on social and economic development is so slow. Why sign so many declarations if there isn’t the political will to carry them out?  One thing we have learned from work in policy and advocacy efforts is that there is no substitute for political commitment. Historically, we saw it in Thailand and South Korea; today we see it in Rwanda and Malawi. Leaders must step up and speak out in favor of the issues that they are supporting through these declarations.

Most of the problems that African nations face require resources and capacity—in addition to political will—to resolve. And many of these declarations lay out strategies or approaches that contribute to key issues—maternal mortality, youth employment, health care finance. Until these efforts receive the needed resources to design and carry out culturally relevant programs, and people are trained to implement them effectively, these problems are not going to vanish. Creating a declaration of wishes will not solve critical development issues.

At the same time, many of these declarations don’t address some of the key underlying issues because they might challenge and disrupt cultural norms. Yet some cultural norms are precisely the things that need to be changed. What good comes from marrying off a girl at age 12? What benefits come from female genital cutting? Are cultures really better off by pulling young girls out of school to care for younger siblings, fetch water, and find fire wood? Are macho attitudes carried on by the next generation of boys going to improve society?

The challenges of Africa are complex, and they won’t get resolved by themselves. Creating proclamations, declarations, and regional policies are an important first step. But to see real improvement, we will also need to see real political commitment, adequate resources, investments in people, and a willingness to address the underlying issues. To get countries on track for realizing a demographic dividend, they will have to resolve the nagging issues related to social and economic development and make investments that are more than just talk!

by Jay Gribble, vice president, International Programs

Listening to participants at the expert meeting on industrialization for Africa, I’m struck by the fact that so much of the discussion focuses on economic development but there is little or no mention of the relationship that social development plays in the process. Talk about jobs creation, becoming middle-income countries, and increasing GNI per capita is important, but for many of these things to take place, nations will need to look at some of the underlying social issues that drive the desired economic growth. Our discussions about the demographic dividend—a model for economic development—have highlighted a number of issues related to social development, and we must not lose sight of how interrelated social development is with economic development.

One of the opportunities that the demographic dividend offers is increasing the size of the working-age population (ages 15 to 64) and creating jobs for them. When families are smaller, women can spend more time in the labor force and contribute more to economic growth. But to get to that point, countries must also focus on the necessary social conditions to allow women to be more active participants in the labor force.

Changing attitudes will be critical to setting the stage for a demographic dividend. Until norms change—families getting smaller, ending child marriage, both boys and girls having access to school, ensuring equal employment opportunities—it’s unlikely that countries will move toward a dividend. I’m heartened that the ministers call for increased and sustained investment in health and education, especially for women and girls, and youth and disadvantaged social groups. Yet achieving good health and education for these segments of the population won’t happen without pushing and prodding. Improving economic development depends first on achieving social development. One isn’t likely to happen without the other. Similar to many other development processes, it’s impossible to separate social development from economic development because they tend to be intrinsically linked. So which comes first—social development or economic development—the proverbial chicken or egg? Or does it matter? Perhaps the more important issue is to recognize that both must be addressed with deliberate policies that lead to a full set of desired development outcomes.

by Jay Gribble, vice president, International Programs

Thailand often is held up as a model of success for its efforts in family planning, but it’s amazing how quickly the country has transformed from rural and very poor to the modern economic powerhouse it is today, in a matter of a few decades. Yet Dr. Kosit Panpiemras, former minister of finance and industry of Thailand, laid out the story of Thailand’s success in four succinct points. It wasn’t easy for Thailand to accomplish its goals, but the policies and investments the country made were strategic and targeted.

Infrastructure policies. In the early 1960s, Thailand began investing in infrastructure. The country was rural and the economy was based on subsistence farming. By building roads and installing irrigation, farmers produced more and had an outlet for selling their produce. By helping farmers get their produce to market, the economy became more focused on cash and less on subsistence agriculture. One result was that the need for large families to work the farm changed; as produce was sold, the desire for large families decreased and the desire for cash increased. And as a result, the demand for family planning increased. Another side effect was that people were available to work in places other than the farm.

Population policy. In the 1970s, Thailand turned its attention to a population policy. Because there were fewer people working in agriculture, more people began looking for other sources of work, and as a result, there was a high level of underemployment. Technocrats suggested that Thailand develop a population policy based on two key goals: reducing fertility; and integrating maternal and child health into the health system, and creating public awareness about family planning. Many people know the story of Thailand’s successful family planning program, but they may not realize that it fits into the bigger story of the country’s development.

Rural development policy. In the 1980s, Thailand started a program that focused on specific rural areas where poverty levels were especially high. The government set aside funds for “social infrastructure”—health and education systems—so that people in these areas could have better access to these vital services within 10 years. This change didn’t happen overnight, but the government set realistic targets and followed through on them. By prioritizing health in rural areas, Thailand also increased access to family planning. Social infrastructure also included the skills of people in rural areas—literacy and numeracy. Recognizing that these skills are critical to entering into the labor market, increasing literacy and numeracy also allowed people to move from farms and rural areas to other parts of the country.

Industrialization policy. In the 1960s, when Thailand embarked on this journey, it had a limited domestic market and people’s skill levels were low. The country developed an investment policy to encourage investments from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, beginning with the labor-intensive light industry. By the 1970s, Thailand began to see the result of these direct foreign investments, with growing sectors like garments and textiles. Women participated in the labor force and contributed to economic growth. Planners selected to expand labor-intensive industries as a way to create jobs. Since then, Thailand has taken advantage of natural gas, expanded small and medium investments, and products for export. Over time, industrialization has made Thailand a growing part of the global supply chain.

Though these four policy areas set the stage for Thailand’s economic growth, today the country faces a set of issues related to population aging that pose different challenges. Trying not to exceed its capacity, Thailand is focusing on fostering strong savings and financial systems, and increasing investments in higher education and research.

So what does the story of Thailand have to say to African nations? Plenty! Though the world has changed, the experience of Thailand is of a country that identified key areas for attention, took advantage of opportunities, invested in people, and got ahead. The specifics for African nations may be different because the world has changed, but the bold approach that Thailand took to making political commitments and following up with needed resources is a critical lesson for many low-income countries today.

by Jay Gribble, vice president, International Programs

It’s interesting to look at the head table where the presenters of this technical session are seated. I’m amazed that it’s nine men. How is it that every presenter is a man, when we are talking about issues like girls’ education, family planning, and child survival—all interventions that are influenced and largely implemented by women? I don’t doubt that having men speak about these issues can be persuasive—especially to other male ministers and experts—but giving a voice to both women and men is critical to fostering the dialogue about social and economic development.

One of the points that I make when talking about the demographic dividend is that gender equality matters! Until women and girls have the same access to health, nutrition, education, and jobs, nations will not realize a demographic dividend. As I travel through both the rural and urban areas of so many African nations, I consistently see women working in the fields, working in markets, and holding families together. Yet these women are so often at inherent structural disadvantages by having limited access to loans and credit; in many countries, inheritance rights that benefit women are either very limited or nonexistent. Until countries approve and enforce more comprehensive gender-equitable laws and policies that address these issues, true progress in economic development will be slow in coming.

My point isn’t to put a token woman on the panel or give a head nod to the importance of girls’ education. I know that everyone associated with this valuable meeting is very supportive of gender equality. But just as youth need to be involved in designing youth programs, women need to be involved in discussions that shape economic development. There is little substitute for giving a voice to women to speak from their own experience and perspective—even when talking about scientific evidence.